Posted by
hwalker on Tuesday, April 22, 2008 2:07:21 PM
In an effort to give all ideas equal air time, this blog will discuss Elite Theory. Hang in there, this one is rough. Previously we discussed pluralism, the notion that those who have grievences against the government can form associations, petition the government and affect policy outcomes in their favor. This explanation for the mechanism by which government responds to the people is thought to be the foundation of democracy. But, it could be said that it is also idealistic and naive when confronted with the reality of how the government is subject to capitol.
The central tenants of pluralism are based, in sum, on the following principles: that power is not central, but dispersed; that the state acts as an impartial referee between competing interests; that there are many competing interests that converge around a given issue; and that these competing interests result in policy by consensus (Held 1996). The first principal, that power is not central but dispersed, is one that is easily debated. C. Wright Mills wrote that in an age where government jurisdiction is increasingly centralized, so then is the ability to influence significant decisions that have far greater reach and impact than ever before (1956). Mills goes on to assert that the combination of an unprecedented amount of wealth produced by the growing American economy and the centralization of government has resulted in an American elite (1956). An examination of who successfully wields and influences governmental power reveals a relative concentration of effort and resources (Domhoff 2002).
William Domhoff successfully articulates for us who makes up the ever-illusive “they” that harrows conspiracy theories everywhere, and is often used in reference to ideas of an elite ruling class. He does so by exploring who controls wealth and large corporations in America. It is discovered that Corporate America is intimately connected through overlapping Boards of Directors in what he calls the “Corporate Community,” (2002). The network serves to protect and work for the common interest of big businesses, namely the continuation of profit. This demonstrates that capitol is concentrated. It also partially dismantles the claim by pluralists that power is widely dispersed, if you view capitol as an inherent form of power. A closer look at how the Corporate Community relates to the government further breaks down that idea. What we find is that the Corporate Community has its fingers in all aspects of government, from using its vast wealth to finance campaigns to get one of their own elected, to then filling key appointments with members from the Community, to influencing policy decisions that favor the profit margins of big business (Domhoff 2002). This, in combination with the concentration of wealth that exists within the Corporate Community makes a strong case for the idea that power is indeed centralized, and not dispersed. But like you needed me to tell you that, right? The myth that power and wealth is equally dispersed can be busted anytime you dirve down the highway, and that punk kid with the earing and the PhD in computer science buzzes past you in his 2008 mercedes.
The second claim of pluralism- that the government acts as an impartial referee between competing interests- is easily taken apart. In fact, the struggle that exists most readily in American politics is the dynamic tension between rights and dollars, equality and efficiency (Okun 1975). This tension is a natural result of setting up a government that gives it’s people inalienable rights through due process, while creating policy that invests in systems, particularly our economic system, capitalism (Okun 1975). Capitalism naturally breeds inequality. While it would seem that the government should react in a way that establishes equilibrium, doing so would mean sacrificing the productivity of the economy. When the economy fails, the populace demands new government officials who they perceive can do a better job (Domhoff 2002). Because of this reaction, it is natural for the state to act in favor of the economy (Okun 1975, Domhoff 2002, Held 1996). The state is not an impartial referee between competing interests groups, but rather its inherent structure encourages competition and then favors our system of economics, capitalism. Further more, this link between government and capitol investment makes the issue of how the government responds to its people inherently one of class.
This brings us to the third and fourth assumptions of pluralist theory: that there are many competing interests that converge around a given issue and that these competing interests result in policy by consensus. Inherent in this statement is the presumption that those with power have not taken steps to put up road blocks for other parties attempting to utilize their resources to affect change. E.E. Schattschneider explores the idea that those with power can affect the ability of others to act in opposition to them. He outlines a theory of conflict for us which states that “every fight consists of two parts: (1) the few individuals who are actively engaged at the center and (2) the audience that is irresistibly attracted to the scene,” (1975, 62). He continues on to assert that the outcome of the conflict is dictated by how the audience chooses to react. He refers to the “scope” of a conflict as the means by which parties directly involved can maintain control over the outcome (1975, 64). In other words, if the conflict is kept private in the hands of a few people, those people can dictate its outcome. If the conflict becomes public and a greater portion of the audience is included in resolving the conflict, its resolution leaves the hands of the few and is dictated by the voice of the majority. This theory has very interesting implications in terms of elite theory because it suggests, based on the premise that there is an elite class who have managed to coordinate their accumulated power, that this group of people might have a means of a silencing the voices of their opposition through privatizing conflict. Those who have interests contrary to the interests of the Corporate Community cannot be heard because the Corporate Community so dominates the political sphere that no authorized representative would, or could, get it placed on an agenda to be voted on in the first place (Domfoff 2002). This demonstrates the wielding of power beyond the actual decision making process and into the realm of agenda setting. If that is the case, the pluralist assumption that there are many competing interests that result in policy by consensus is false. Rather, there are competing interests but if they have converged around an issue that matters to the Corporate Community, the result is policy in favor of the Corporate Community (Domhoff 2002).
Alright, I know that was painful, but at least you didn't have to write it. Lets recap: Pluralists make four assumptions when advocating their ideals of how the government responds to interest group involvement. To begin with, it is assumed that power is not centralized, that the state acts as an impartial referee between competing interests, that there are many competing interests that converge around a given issue, and finally that these competing interests result in policy by consensus. By examining elite theory it was revealed that power is, in fact, centralized. Furthermore, a discussion of the state as an impartial referee linked power to resource management, as dictated by the way our government is naturally set up. The combination of these two discoveries makes it unreasonable to assume that policy decisions are reached by consensus. Rather, that claim was qualified with the requirement that the issue not be of interest to the Corporate Elite. This counter argument to pluralism confirms what we already know: The government has too much control over our lives and cares too little about what we think about that. The thing that this study should lead us to recognize is that the issues that we face now, and that we will face in the future, are issues of class. Contrary to what the two democratic candidates would have you believe, prejudice against skin color and sex are possibly gone forever, thanks to those who worked before us. But they have been replaced by prejudice based on economic standing. And why shouldn’t they have been? Capitalism always leads to inequality, and our second favorite thing next to democracy in this country is "the silent hand of the market."
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. “The Higher Circles.” The Classics of Interest Group Behavior (2006). Ed. Robert M. Alexander. Belmont:
Thomson Wadsworth.
Domhoff, G. William. 2002. Who Rules America: Power and Politics. 4th Ed. Boston: McGraw Hill.
Okun, Arthur M. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.
Held, David. 1996. Models of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Schattschneider, E.E. 1975. “The Contagiousness of Conflict.” The Classics of Interest Group Behavior (2006). Ed. Robert M.
Alexander. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.